The Idea of the Politicization of Intelligence is Not a Helpful One-English Essay Sample

QUESTION

Essay on the topic

The idea of the politicization of intelligence is not a helpful one – all intelligence is politicized.

6000 Words

Journal Analysis of Article

Evaluating the Quality of IntelligenceAnalysis: By What (Mis) Measure?’

2000 Words

ANSWER

THE IDEA OF THE POLITICISATION OF INTELLIGENCE IS NOT A HELPFUL ONE – ALL INTELLIGENCE IS POLITICISED.

Introduction

Politicization marks the action that causes an event or an activity more political in nature. Politics is a domain which is responsible for public administration and makes the execution of decision as per the well being of the country1. There are activities associated with the exercise of power by those who hold position of governance.

Politicisation often misinterpreted as the better way to improve the decision or policy making process. However, most of the previous empirical examples are not supporting this statement. These examples and cases strongly represent a comparison of the prevailing policies and preceding policies in the society. As a result, it is clear that the preceding policies in the global context have some issues after the politicisation of intelligence. Generally, this often happens when the intelligence analysis is twisted. This brings unintentional outcome to the policymakers. The political parties often manipulate the data collection and distribution process in the organisation. This makes the entire system corrupted as per the intelligent emphasise. The pressurized emphasize and finding often supports policies and preference. The main problem was that the intelligence argument could not be depoliticized as it could not be kept undisclosed.

Generally, the politicization is done by completely ignoring those ideas which are not supporting the policies. The policymakers may not completely express their feeling about personal advancement. These were prominent in different cases in the various countries such as Syria, Iraq and other. Syria is also one of the countries to experience the serious impact of the politicization of intelligence.

The essay is going to examine and discuss the different aspects of the relationship between them and the different ways by which intelligence analysis could be becoming politicized. In this essay the different ways in which politicisation of intelligence can be done would be analyzed with the help of different historical examples which will help distinguish the different types of ways in which politicisation can be done2. Involvement of political decision into general decision making changes whole path and make politicized. Due to which, the particular situation based on which strategic decision is taken simply becomes major issue of politics. Political decision is taken for well-being of public administration by executing appropriate strategy.

Discussion:

Politicisation of intelligence takes place when the intelligence analysis gets turn aside either in a deliberate manner or inadvertently for the purpose of giving the policymakers a desired result. There can be multiple of ways in which intelligence can be become corrupted as a result of it being politicized3. As a result of this interference the intelligence agency estimates will be skewed for supporting personal advancement of the political parties4.

On the same context, civil persons or civil servants are the policy specialist as they have been working in the domain for some years5. Therefore, in order to make the best possible decisions, ministers normally depend upon the suggestion or advice of the civil workers. In the same way, it can be concluded that in most of the cases civil servants are the permanent employees of the government whereas politicians are not the permanent rather can be explained as the birds of passage6. Now, the pivotal fact is that, in the present times, a polarization of intelligence is very popular terns in the political domain; Politicisation of intelligence is taken place when the intelligence analysis is distorted either inadvertently or deliberately. The reason behind the concept is to give desire results to the policy makers7. The legal obstacles have critically evaluated the management of policies in the market. The restrictive laws and checking of sensitive information is highly required in the intelligent agencies. This can be the best alternative to resolve such issues in the global environment. The management of political and specific policies is highly required to prevent such high attention to the challenges in the Transitional Societies, Secrecy and the Public Interest. Apart from that the prohibiting intelligence agencies into the laws making and another political decision making has resulted a regulatory pressure over the governance. Apart from that the adversary and the advocacy issues were present after having the politicisation of intelligence.

The author has stated that the there is a relationship between policy making and strategies intelligence for the discourse. The authors have stated the relationship between intelligence agencies and the citizens. This relation is strongly related with the policy making in different sector. The concept proximity and the politicisation represent the claim and different types of interpretation. The democratic policy making is an effective process for managing the traditional and potential sources. Generally, it has been observed that the idea of the politicisation of intelligence in different aspects of policy making in business environment. Authors have pointed out certain external influences over the intelligence area. In the same context, some policy makers are indifferent and the reason is that they consider it matters or seldom happens when it requires8.

Different ways including monetary transaction and hidden charge are included in case of having idea of politics into decision taken by intelligence department. Intelligence department is fully concerned in taking strategic decision on the basis of national policy and cybersecurity as well as trade policy9. On the contrary, involvement of political decision and idea of politics are major reasons for improper strategy for large number of people10.

Idea of politicization assists in explaining relationship as well as level of power between political leaders and Government employees. Public bureaucracy is less powerful in regards to normative types of claims. Executive policy makers depend mostly on decision taken by political leaders11. On the other hand, Government employees and specialists of civil services depend upon policy specialist due to assisting in taking strategic decision12. From the following point of view, it is clear that for the purpose of making best strategic decision, ministers depend upon final decision taken by civil workers. In some context, it can be observed that civil workers provide the final strategic solution without considering decision of politicians based on which significant improvement can be done.

Presently, involvement of idea of politics into decision taken by department of intelligence has been most common factor which affects life of common people. Providing strategic information regarding national security and economic situation are key responsibilities ofdepartment of intelligence without considering decision taken by political leaders13. On the contrary, politicization into department of intelligence is taken place in case of providing lack of appropriate information regarding national security and crime incidents14.

Involvement of intelligence is most common factor in case of making decision and providing strategic information regarding national security and cyber protection to large number of policy makers. Policy makers take decision regarding improvement of national security and cyber security of a nation due to which legal support from department of intelligence is essential15. On the other hand, in some cases, intelligence analysts are pressurized by political leaders to include particular data and guidelines into different policy based on security and cyber protection of a nation16. From the following point of view, it is clear that, without considering decision of political leaders and including idea of politics into decision taken by department of intelligence, appropriate and legal policy can be implemented.

Politicization of department of intelligence is considered as negative effect due to losing trust and hope on common people of a nation. In the following context, fewer number of policy makers consider own decision as a final one and keep belief on self management due tohaving positive impact on living standard of common people17. On the contrary, in some cases, without considering decision of political leaders and idea of politicism, policy makers will not be able to take strategic decision regarding safety of country and security policy18. From the following point of view, it can be demonstrated that politicisation of intelligence is mostly considered as evil due to revolving around idea of politics. Apart from that, involvement of intelligence agency is significant aspects in case of making decision regarding national security and cyber crime. Department of intelligence has responsibility to gather significant and appropriate information regarding national security and cyber protection based on which policy makers will be able to implement appropriate policy19. On the contrary, in some cases without considering decision of political leaders and idea of politics, specific policy cannot be implemented20. Making of specific policy based on security and appropriate treatment for intelligence department is vital due to maintaining confidentiality and avoiding future issues. Politicization of department of intelligence establishes issues for maker of policy and whole enterprise. Terrorist attack and deaths of common people in Iraq is simply greatest failure of intelligence agency due to not gathering sufficient informationregarding issues over the country and reason of creating issues. Vietnam War for long term is also considered as failure of taking strategic decision by department of intelligence and involvement of idea of politics. Involvement of politicism into decision making process could be negative way to reduce chances of creating appropriate policy21. On the other hand, without considering idea of politics, appropriate strategy regarding the way of maintaining peace over a nation cannot be taken significantly22. Due to corruption, Central Intelligence Agency has avoided to include required forces which have been considered as involvement of politicism. From the following point of view, it can be elaborated that in case of following decision and strategy of politics, decision taken by policy makers can be considered as illegal one due to not assisting common people. Political aspects regarding WMD case of wars in Iraq is mostly considered as failure of department of intelligence due to having political pressure as well as illegal way of delivering weapons. Due to which, common people are affected negatively. Interrelation between democratic states as well as intelligence of analytics is existed significantly. Political influence in context of making policy based on national security and cyber protection in Iraq is considered most significant failure of intelligence. Providing strategic information regarding national security and economic situation are key responsibilities of department of intelligence without considering decision taken by political leaders

The utilization of three distinct focal points is done for organizing the discussion regarding intelligence analysis23. The author has stated that the contentious manipulation from political interference to the national securities agencies and national intelligence agencies might result a negative impact in the country24. Additionally, author has provided the example of the Iraq War in 2003. John Howard (Prime minister) has remarked the confidential role and clear idea on the governance ten years earlier25.

In the real word, a politicization of intelligence is paradoxes that makethe intelligence worst thing but in some cases, authors considered it as the best thing. The derogatory presumption makes the concept harder and the reason is that it navigates toward the best forms and away from the pits. The common idea, to serve stakes or policy preferences behind the derogatory suggestion is the distorting information26. The above situation can be explained with the help of the Obama administration regarding the Asad Government case situation when the Assad governments, to suppress its citizens, used chemical weapons. During that situation, Defence Secretary Chuck Hagel opined that evidence is one thing and suspicions are another. However, at the end of the process, the administration of the US government stated that the intelligence community was assessed the situation that Syrian regime used chemical weapons on a huge scale before the situation happened27. However, to gather the facts White house was dependent on the U.N. investigation team but was not interested to implement the policies in the actual situation28. Such situations are generally considered as the most unconcealed forms of politicisation that fabricated information to make stronger policy. Therefore, such a thing is the general image of politicization but the problem is that such a situation takes place definitely.

On the other hand, the author has argued with the previous idea that policy making for an Intelligence agency is vital. This also keeps the information confidential and free from any future issue29. The authors have also indicated that the policy-making for such intelligence agencies is vital because this prevents various negative impacts. The authors have also stated that the 9/11 terror attack is the simple failure of Intelligent Community (IC). The WMD program of Iraq was not illustrated properly. However, analytical manipulation was evident in the community. The sound intelligence advice to the policymakers in the case of policy making can enhance the effectiveness of such policies. It can be observed in recent years that the politicization of intelligence in those areas.

Different types of a problem including unsatisfied decision and inappropriate action are created at the time of international war as well as international scandal which are known as political interference. Along with that, interference of politics over national and international intelligence agencies is an issue in case of taking decision regarding national security and cyber protection30. Therefore, from the following point of view, it is clear that considering idea of politics at the time of taking decision regarding national policy could be negative impact on living standard of a nation. Involvement of intelligence agency at the time of Iraq attack is considered as major factor due to including corruption as well as negligence and other factors31. Involvement of intelligence agency is biggest factor in case of occurring cyber attack and terrorists due to which taking a decision without considering idea of politics is important factor. On the contrary, in some cases taking decision regarding national policy and cyber attack is considered a difficult one due to which consideration of idea of politics is significant32. Lack of confidentiality and releasing information are key issues in case of occurring international scandal beyond which negligence of national intelligence is important33. On the other hand, confidentiality of important information assists in maintaining cyber security and protection of nation which impacts positively on living standard of common people.

Common practice of intelligence agency is to serve people of nation in a better way with implementing effective national policy based on cyber security and national security. Politicization of department of intelligence is most important factor for the purpose of having negative impact on decision taken by Government agencies34.

Australian intelligence department follows three significant steps such as gathering as well as analysis of data and dissemination based on which appropriate policy can be implemented significantly35. The purpose of following three significant steps is to protect all citizens and fulfil their requirements. Government organizations and department of intelligence have responsibility to protect all citizens with the aid of implementing appropriate national policy. In case of security of parliament, politicized intelligence is considered as key factor36. Three significant factors such as involvement as well as politicization and political influence have adverse impact on decision based on national security and national policy. From the following point of view, it is clear that involvement and influence from political leader’s impact negatively on decision taken by department of intelligence. Politicization of department of intelligence in Australia is considered as most influential factor of implementing national policy which impacts negatively on living standard of common people37. The long-term Vietnam War is also a pivotal example of politicization of intelligence. Furthermore, the 1967 argument over the estimate of collective military strength in South Vietnam war was also one of the pivotal examples of politicization of intelligence. In terms of the officially published data, the actual estimated number was SNIE 14.3-67 but it settled categories were less than the estimated number38. The above situation did not neutralize the effect on the estimated figure but made the exercise strictly honest. However, such situation raised the question regarding the estimation procedure. In connection with the conference between MACV (Military Assistance Command, Vietnam) and CIA (Central Intelligence Agency), there were examples of raw politicisation. Therefore, the above situation can be considered as the military applied methodological double standards. In the regard, the authors stated that the above example was not a result of the politicisation of intelligence39. The authors has raised query over the WMD case of Iraq. The National Intelligence has overestimated that the weapons of mass destruction capabilities of Iraq40. There was a claim regarding the political pressure and biases over the Weapon of mass destruction capabilities of Iraq. The author has stated that the intelligence has three main concepts such as the planning, direction and dissemination stages41. The protection of citizen is the first priority of the government and the intelligence agencies hence; they distribute the information to the relevant parties42. In agreement with previous idea, the authors have stated that the politicised of intelligence is a common term in the case of parliament security43. There are three steps such as involvement, politicisation and influence.

The external research has managed to experience the politicization of intelligence in Australia44. The major perspectives and analysis over the forms, conditions, means, ideas etc were in the part of politicisation area. There are many historical cases for explanation over the politicisation of intelligence (Iraq WDM)45. For example, the case of Australian defence intelligence organisation (DIO) in 1987 has predicted that the military coup in Fiji. The policy making officials has experienced different types of challenges. In accurate conclusions and interference from political parties could damage the careers of the politicians46. It was also found later in 1995 that there were flaws in the joint intelligence staff and the potential military threats in the Northern Australia. These flaws have affected the defence force planning in Northern Australia47. The historical intelligence agencies have significant result in the Australian context. The first intelligence operations have conducted during the formation time of Commonwealth at the time of 1901. However, the Australian context may not be spectacular to understand the theories along with some insight views into the subject48.

In agreement with previous idea, the authors have pointed out towards the role of parliament security policies after the end of cold war49. It can be said that the politics has played a very important role in the cold war. The emerging and security realm from parliaments is integrated part of the policymaking. The special issues might be related with the contribution at different angle50. It is required to have further refinement to hold promises during the decision making. The European countries were not free from this politicisation of intelligence agencies. The authors have stated that the Human rights and surveillance system in various area51. The intelligence services are not only dedicated to the policy making services but also other various areas52. This is developed to offer a classified arrangement in Europe during the policy making. It can be said that the German Parliament has specific inquiry regarding the activities management53.

In the case of the Japanese market after the World War II, politicisation of intelligence is quite prominent. Political interference in the Japanese market reported the Mejii restoration after the end of World War II54. The translation in mainland of Asia has reported the ineffectiveness in the market. The Japan has broad case in terms of managing the human intelligence has structured in the environment55.

The authors have stated the intelligence system to manage the intelligence culture in the environment. Politicisation of intelligence in home and abroad was evident even in Japan. These political involvements in the Japan have strongly focused to deliver intelligence culture. The primary documents in US and UK has strongly delivered to understand the interference from the political parties56.

There might be different types of potential downsides in the policy making. This interference from politicisation might directly affect the intelligence agencies. As per the views of Caparini (2016), the controlling and confronts has related the structural problems in the society.

In contrary with previous ideas, the authors have described that the especial challenges have invoked in the different security areas57. The author has pointed out towards the issues which are affecting the democracy and justice58. The idea of politicisation of intelligence may not be the best alternative in the security environment59. In agreement with previews idea, the authors have pointed out different types of issues in the public dimension to handle the security agencies60. The large networks were directly related in the case of social reconciliation. The effects of such behaviour of security agencies in a country could have different result from that of planned. The responsible crimes in the state security could face different types of challenges because of the role of government61. It has been observed in many country clashes of media and government. This can have a distinct issue in the state and country. The defensive nature of the authority often hides the politicisation of intelligence from public media and journals62. However, the negative impact of politicisation in the policy making has come out with a bad impact in the society63

The legal obstacles have critically evaluated the management of policies in the market. The restrictive laws and checking of sensitive information is highly required in the intelligent agencies64. The author has stated that the there is a relationship between policy making and strategies intelligence for the discourse65. The authors have stated the relationship between intelligence agencies and the citizens. Authors have pointed out certain external influences over the intelligence area66.

Politicisation often misinterpreted as the better way to improve the decision or policy making process. However, most of the previous empirical examples are not supporting this statement. These examples and cases strongly represent a comparison of the prevailing policies and preceding policies in the society67. The political parties often manipulate the data collection and distribution process in the organisation68. This makes the entire system corrupted as per the intelligent emphasise. The pressurized emphasize and finding often supports policies and preference. The main problem was that the intelligence argument could not be depoliticized as it could not be kept undisclosed.

Generally, the politicization is done by completely ignoring those ideas which are not supporting the policies. The policymakers may not completely express their feeling about personal advancement. These were prominent in different cases in the various countries such as Syria, Iraq and other69. Syria is also one of the countries to experience the serious impact of the politicization of intelligence70.

Conclusion:

In conclusion from this essay, it can be derived that, over the last many years, intelligence analysis has been politicized but the fact is that some Scott and Jackson, (2004) supported the concept because of its benefits factors. Similarly, on the contrary, some authors criticized the concepts because of its negative impacts on society. Therefore, the above essay examines both aspects of the relationship to analyze the actual meaning of the politicization of intelligence and its impact on society.

In conclusion from this essay, it can be derived that, over the last many years, intelligence analysis has been politicized but the fact is that some Scott and Jackson, (2004) supported the concept because of its benefits factors. Similarly, on the contrary, some authors criticized the concepts because of its negative impacts on society71. Therefore, the above essay examines both aspects of the relationship to analyze the actual meaning of the politicization of intelligence and its impact on society. It can be concluded that the control and critical issues in the governing factors. The critical reporting in the environment has brought different types of challenges in society. Authors have stated that the prohibiting regulatory pressure in the sensitive environment could result in a negative impact in the officials72. It can be also extracted that the idea of the politicisation of intelligence is not the best alternative during the policymaking in a country. In the end, it can be finally concluded that the idea of politicisation has a negative impact on society. It can be concluded that the control and critical issues in the governing factors. The critical reporting in the environment has brought different types of challenges in society. Authors have stated that the prohibiting regulatory pressure in the sensitive environment could result in a negative impact in the officials. The classified and sensitive information of the intelligence agencies might result in a negative impact to society.As evident in the above examples and case studies in the politicization of intelligence has a negative impact on the policymaking. It has been also extracted that the politicisation of intelligencehas created a major to minor drawback in the society.

It can be also extracted that the idea of the politicisation of intelligence is not the best alternative during the policymaking in a country. The groups often interact with the policy makers to understand the decisional impact over the society; this is the primary duty of the intelligence agencies. The clashes of policy making with the political interfere, the objectives of such group changes accordingly. The primary objectives of the society change broadly and the policymaking process was not an exception. The external agencies and the intelligence community strongly focus in terms of the contribution of the politicisation of intelligence. In the end, it can be finally concluded that the idea of politicisation has a negative impact on society.

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Bar-Joseph, U., (2013). The Politicisation of Intelligence: A Comparative Study. International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence26(2), pp.347-369.

Bender, C.E., (2017).Critical Thinking for Strategic Intelligence, By Katherine HibbsPherson and Randolph H. Pherson. Thousand Oaks, CA: CQ Press (an imprint of Sage Publications, Inc.), 2017. Journal of Strategic Security10(1), p.11.

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Byman, D., (2016). Intelligence and its critics. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism39(3), pp.260-280.

Caparini, M., (2016). Controlling and overseeing intelligence services in democratic States. In Democratic Control of Intelligence Services.1(10). pp. 25-46

Clark, R.M., (2016). Intelligence analysis: a target-centric approach. CQ press: London City.

Coletta, G., 2018. Politicising intelligence: what went wrong with the UK and US assessments on Iraqi WMD in 2002. Journal of Intelligence History17(1), pp.65-78.

Cormac, R., (2014). Confronting the Colonies: British Intelligence and Counterinsurgency. Oxford University Press: London.

Crone, M., (2016). Radicalization revisited: violence, politics and the skills of the body. International Affairs92(3), pp.587-604.

Dabke, D., (2016). Impact of leader’s emotional intelligence and transformational behavior on perceived leadership effectiveness: A multiple source view. Business Perspectives and Research4(1), pp.27-40.

Eisenfeld, B., (2017). The Intelligence Dilemma: Proximity and Politicisation –Analysis of External Influences. Journal of Strategic Security10(2), pp.77-96.

Fägersten, B., (2015). Intelligence and decision-making within the Common Foreign and Security Policy. SIEPS, European Policy Analysis. 10(1), pp.2-29.

Gill, P., (2016). Intelligence Governance and Democratisation: A Comparative Analysis of the Limits of Reform. Routledge: Abingdon-on-themes.

Gruszczak, A. (2016). Intelligence Security in the European Union: building a strategic intelligence community. Springer: Berlin.

Hall, S.J., (2017). Blinded by the rising sun: Japanese military intelligence from the first Sino-Japanese War to the end of World War II (Doctoral dissertation).

Hänni, A., (2016). When Casey’s blood pressure rose: a case study of intelligence politicisation in the United States. Intelligence and National Security31(7), pp.963-977.

Hegemann, H., (2018). Toward ‘normal’politics?Security, parliaments and the politicisation of intelligence oversight in the German Bundestag. The British Journal of Politics and International Relations20(1), pp.175-190.

Hinnebusch, R., (2018). Foreign policy making in the Middle East.In The international politics of the Middle East.Manchester University Press: manchester.

Johnson, L.K., (2018). Congress, the Iraq war, and the failures of intelligence oversight.In Intelligence and national security policymaking on Iraq.Manchester University Press: Manchester.

Kim, S.C. and Chung, Y., (2018). Dynamics of Nuclear Power Policy in the Post-Fukushima Era: Interest Structure and Politicisation in Japan, Taiwan and Korea. Asian Studies Review42(1), pp.107-124.

Koch, S. and Weingart, P., 2016. The delusion of knowledge transfer: The impact of foreign aid experts on policy-making in South Africa and Tanzania. African Minds.

Mandel, D.R. and Barnes, A., (2014). Accuracy of forecasts in strategic intelligence. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences111(30), pp.10984-10989.

McCarthy, S.P., (2019). The function of intelligence in crisis management: towards an understanding of the intelligence producer-consumer dichotomy. Routledge: Abingdon-on-themes

McDermott, K.C., (2018). Do Political Appointments Create Politicized Intelligence.Naval Postgraduate School Monterey United States.

McPhee, J., (2015). Spinning the secrets of state: The history and politics of intelligence politicisation in Australia.Manchester University Press: manchester.

Mellers, B., Stone, E., Atanasov, P., Rohrbaugh, N., Metz, S.E., Ungar, L., Bishop, M.M., Horowitz, M., Merkle, E. and Tetlock, P., (2015). The psychology of intelligence analysis: Drivers of prediction accuracy in world politics. Journal of experimental psychology: applied21(1), pp.1-23.

Mello, P.A. and Peters, D., (2018). Parliaments in security policy: Involvement, politicisation, and influence. The British Journal of Politics and International Relations20(1), pp.3-18.

Morales, L., Pilet, J.B. and Ruedin, D., (2015). The gap between public preferences and policies on immigration: A comparative examination of the effect of politicisation on policy congruence. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies41(9), pp.1495-1516.

Phythian, M., (2018). Flawed intelligence, limited oversight: Official inquiries into prewar UK intelligence on Iraq. In Intelligence and national security policymaking on Iraq. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Pillar, P.R., (2018).Intelligence, policy, and the war in Iraq. Manchester University Press: Manchester.

Rubin, M., (2016). The temptation of intelligence politicisation to support diplomacy. International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence29(1), pp.1-25.

Scammell, M., (2015). Politics and image: the conceptual value of branding. Journal of Political Marketing14(1-2), pp.7-18.

Schmitt, H. and Toygür, I., (2016). European Parliament elections of May 2014: driven by national politics or EU policy making?. Politics and governance4(1), pp.167-181.

Seo, H., (2018). Intelligence Politicisation in the Republic of Korea: Implications for Reform. International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence31(3), pp.451-478.

Stephens, B.A., (2010). A Hedge Against Politicisation : An Impartial Intelligence Community for America. ARMY WAR COLL CARLISLE BARRACKS PA.

Tan, C., (2014). Reflective thinking for intelligence analysis using a case study. Reflective Practice15(2), pp.218-231.

van der Maas, H., Kan, K.J. and Borsboom, D., (2014). Intelligence is what the intelligence test measures. Seriously. Journal of Intelligence2(1), pp.12-15.

Voltolini, B., (2015). Lobbying in EU Foreign Policy-making: The case of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.Abingdon-on-themes: Routledge.

Walsh, P.F., (2016). Australian National Security Intelligence Collection Since 9/11: Policy and Legislative Challenges. In National Security, Surveillance and Terror (pp. 51-74). Palgrave Macmillan, Cham.

Wilkinson, M., (2018). Before Intelligence Failed: British Secret Intelligence on Chemical and Biological Weapons in the Soviet Union, South Africa and Libya.Oxford University Press.

Wirtz, J.J., (2016). Understanding Intelligence Failure: Warning, Response and Deterrence. Abingdon-on-themes: Routledge.

Wood, M., (2016). Politicisation, depoliticisation and anti-politics: towards a multilevel research agenda. Political Studies Review14(4), pp.521-533.

1Aldrich, R.J. and Richterova, D., (2018). Ambient accountability: intelligence services in Europe and the decline of state secrecy. West European Politics, 41(4), pp.1-22.

2Bar-Joseph, U., (2013). The Politicisation of Intelligence: A Comparative Study. International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence26(2), pp.347-369.

3Morales, L., Pilet, J.B. and Ruedin, D., (2015). The gap between public preferences and policies on immigration: A comparative examination of the effect of politicisation on policy congruence. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies41(9), pp.1495-1516.

4Koch, S. and Weingart, P., (2016). The delusion of knowledge transfer: The impact of foreign aid experts on policy-making in South Africa and Tanzania. African Minds: Copenhagen.

5Bender, C.E., (2017).Critical Thinking for Strategic Intelligence, By Katherine HibbsPherson and Randolph H. Pherson. Thousand Oaks, CA: CQ Press (an imprint of Sage Publications, Inc.), 2017. Journal of Strategic Security10(1), p.11.

6Voltolini, B., (2015). Lobbying in EU Foreign Policy-making: The case of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Routledge: Abingdon

7Byman, D., (2016). Intelligence and its critics. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism39(3), pp.260-280.

8Caparini, M., (2016). Controlling and overseeing intelligence services in democratic States. In Democratic Control of Intelligence Services. Routledge: Abingdon.

9Tan, C., (2014). Reflective thinking for intelligence analysis using a case study. Reflective Practice15(2), pp.218-231.

10Mello, P.A. and Peters, D., (2018). Parliaments in security policy: Involvement, politicisation, and influence. The British Journal of Politics and International Relations20(1), pp.3-18.

11Cormac, R., (2014). Confronting the Colonies: British Intelligence and Counterinsurgency. Oxford University Press: London.

12Fägersten, B., (2015). Intelligence and decision-making within the Common Foreign and Security Policy. SIEPS, European Policy Analysis. 10(1), pp.2-29.

13Gruszczak, A. (2016). Intelligence Security in the European Union: building a strategic intelligence community. Springer: Berlin.

14Dabke, D., (2016). Impact of leader’s emotional intelligence and transformational behavior on perceived leadership effectiveness: A multiple source view. Business Perspectives and Research4(1), pp.27-40.

15Mandel, D.R. and Barnes, A., (2014). Accuracy of forecasts in strategic intelligence. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences111(30), pp.10984-10989.

16Aldrich, R.J. and Richterova, D., (2018). Ambient accountability: intelligence services in Europe and the decline of state secrecy. West European Politics, pp.1-22. pp.2-23

17Mello, P.A. and Peters, D., (2018). Parliaments in security policy: Involvement, politicisation, and influence. The British Journal of Politics and International Relations20(1), pp.3-18.

18Cormac, R., (2014). Confronting the Colonies: British Intelligence and Counterinsurgency. Oxford University Press: London.

19Fägersten, B., (2015). Intelligence and decision-making within the Common Foreign and Security Policy. SIEPS, European Policy Analysis. 10(1), pp.2-29.

20Aldrich, R.J. and Richterova, D., (2018). Ambient accountability: intelligence services in Europe and the decline of state secrecy. West European Politics, pp.1-22. pp.2-23

21Fägersten, B., (2015). Intelligence and decision-making within the Common Foreign and Security Policy. SIEPS, European Policy Analysis. 10(1), pp.2-29.

22Dabke, D., (2016). Impact of leader’s emotional intelligence and transformational behavior on perceived leadership effectiveness: A multiple source view. Business Perspectives and Research4(1), pp.27-40.

23Coletta, G., (2018). Politicising intelligence: what went wrong with the UK and US assessments on Iraqi WMD in 2002. Journal of Intelligence History17(1), pp.65-78.

24McPhee, J., (2015). Spinning the secrets of state: The history and politics of intelligence politicisation in Australia. Routledge: Abingdon.

25Eisenfeld, B., (2017). The Intelligence Dilemma: Proximity and Politicisation –Analysis of External Influences. Journal of Strategic Security10(2), pp.77-96.

26Wirtz, J.J., (2016). Understanding Intelligence Failure: Warning, Response and Deterrence. Routledge: Abingdon.

27Voltolini, B., (2015). Lobbying in EU Foreign Policy-making: The case of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.Routledge: Abingdon.

28Gill, P., (2016). Intelligence Governance and Democratisation: A Comparative Analysis of the Limits of Reform. Routledge: Abingdon.

29Hall, S.J., (2017). Blinded by the rising sun: Japanese military intelligence from the first Sino-Japanese War to the end of World War II (Doctoral dissertation). Roultedge: Abingdon.

30Caparini, M., (2016). Controlling and overseeing intelligence services in democratic States. In Democratic Control of Intelligence Services.1(10). pp. 25-46

31Crone, M., (2016). Radicalization revisited: violence, politics and the skills of the body. International Affairs92(3), pp.587-604.

32McCarthy, S.P., (2019). The function of intelligence in crisis management: towards an understanding of the intelligence producer-consumer dichotomy. Routledge: Abingdon

33Scammell, M., (2015). Politics and image: the conceptual value of branding. Journal of Political Marketing14(1-2), pp.7-18.

34Pillar, P.R., (2018).Intelligence, policy, and the war in Iraq.In Intelligence and national security policymaking on Iraq. Manchester University Press: Manchester.

35McCarthy, S.P., (2019). The function of intelligence in crisis management: towards an understanding of the intelligence producer-consumer dichotomy. Routledge: Abingdon

36Crone, M., (2016). Radicalization revisited: violence, politics and the skills of the body. International Affairs92(3), pp.587-604.

37Caparini, M., (2016). Controlling and overseeing intelligence services in democratic States. In Democratic Control of Intelligence Services.1(10). pp. 25-46

38Schmitt, H. and Toygür, I., (2016). European Parliament elections of May 2014: driven by national politics or EU policy making?. Politics and governance4(1), pp.167-181.

39Hegemann, H., (2018). Toward ‘normal’politics?Security, parliaments and the politicisation of intelligence oversight in the German Bundestag. The British Journal of Politics and International Relations20(1), pp.175-190.

40Bar-Joseph, U., (2013). The Politicisation of Intelligence: A Comparative Study. International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence26(2), pp.347-369.

41Bar-Joseph, U., (2013). The Politicisation of Intelligence: A Comparative Study. International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence26(2), pp.347-369.

42Coletta, G., (2018). Politicising intelligence: what went wrong with the UK and US assessments on Iraqi WMD in 2002. Journal of Intelligence History17(1), pp.65-78.

43Mello, P.A. and Peters, D., (2018). Parliaments in security policy: Involvement, politicisation, and influence. The British Journal of Politics and International Relations20(1), pp.3-18.

44Aldrich, R.J. and Richterova, D., (2018). Ambient accountability: intelligence services in Europe and the decline of state secrecy. West European Politics, pp.1-22.

45Kim, S.C. and Chung, Y., (2018). Dynamics of Nuclear Power Policy in the Post-Fukushima Era: Interest Structure and Politicisation in Japan, Taiwan and Korea. Asian Studies Review42(1), pp.107-124.

46Wirtz, J.J., (2016). Understanding Intelligence Failure: Warning, Response and Deterrence.Routledge: Abingdon.

47Phythian, M., (2018). Flawed intelligence, limited oversight: Official inquiries into prewar UK intelligence on Iraq. In Intelligence and national security policymaking on Iraq.Manchester University Press: Manchester

48Wood, M., (2016). Politicisation, depoliticisation and anti-politics: towards a multilevel research agenda. Political Studies Review14(4), pp.521-533.

49Mello, P.A. and Peters, D., (2018). Parliaments in security policy: Involvement, politicisation, and influence. The British Journal of Politics and International Relations20(1), pp.3-18.

50Wilkinson, M., (2018). Before Intelligence Failed: British Secret Intelligence on Chemical and Biological Weapons in the Soviet Union, South Africa and Libya.Oxford University Press: Oxford

51Aldrich, R.J. and Richterova, D., (2018). Ambient accountability: intelligence services in Europe and the decline of state secrecy. West European Politics, 41(4), pp.1-22.

52Walsh, P.F., (2016). Australian National Security Intelligence Collection Since 9/11: Policy and Legislative Challenges. In National Security, Surveillance and Terror (pp. 51-74). Palgrave Macmillan, Cham.

53Wirtz, J.J., (2016). Understanding Intelligence Failure: Warning, Response and Deterrence.Routledge: Abingdon

54McPhee, J., (2015). Spinning the secrets of state: The history and politics of intelligence politicisation in Australia.

55Voltolini, B., (2015). Lobbying in EU Foreign Policy-making: The case of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Routledge: Abingdon.

56Phythian, M., (2018). Flawed intelligence, limited oversight: Official inquiries into prewar UK intelligence on Iraq. In Intelligence and national security policymaking on Iraq.Manchester University Press: Manchester

57Hegemann, H., (2018). Toward ‘normal’politics?Security, parliaments and the politicisation of intelligence oversight in the German Bundestag. The British Journal of Politics and International Relations20(1), pp.175-190.

58Walsh, P.F., (2016). Australian National Security Intelligence Collection Since 9/11: Policy and Legislative Challenges. In National Security, Surveillance and Terror (pp. 51-74). Palgrave Macmillan, Cham.

59Stephens, B.A., (2010). A Hedge Against Politicisation : An Impartial Intelligence Community for America. ARMY WAR COLL CARLISLE BARRACKS PA.Manchester University Press: Manchester.

60Gill, P., (2016). Intelligence Governance and Democratisation: A Comparative Analysis of the Limits of Reform. Routledge: Abingdon.

61Hänni, A., (2016). When Casey’s blood pressure rose: a case study of intelligence politicisation in the United States. Intelligence and National Security31(7), pp.963-977.

62Morales, L., Pilet, J.B. and Ruedin, D., (2015). The gap between public preferences and policies on immigration: A comparative examination of the effect of politicisation on policy congruence. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies41(9), pp.1495-1516.

63Rubin, M., (2016). The temptation of intelligence politicisation to support diplomacy. International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence29(1), pp.1-25.

64Seo, H., (2018). Intelligence Politicisation in the Republic of Korea: Implications for Reform. International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence31(3), pp.451-478.

65Eisenfeld, B., (2017). The Intelligence Dilemma: Proximity and Politicisation –Analysis of External Influences. Journal of Strategic Security10(2), pp.77-96.

66Wilkinson, M., (2018). Before Intelligence Failed: British Secret Intelligence on Chemical and Biological Weapons in the Soviet Union, South Africa and Libya.Oxford University Press: Oxford.

67Schmitt, H. and Toygür, I., (2016). European Parliament elections of May 2014: driven by national politics or EU policy making?. Politics and governance4(1), pp.167-181.

68Kim, S.C. and Chung, Y., (2018). Dynamics of Nuclear Power Policy in the Post-Fukushima Era: Interest Structure and Politicisation in Japan, Taiwan and Korea. Asian Studies Review42(1), pp.107-124.

69Johnson, L.K., (2018). Congress, the Iraq war, and the failures of intelligence oversight.In Intelligence and national security policymaking on Iraq.Manchester University Press: Manchester.

70Rubin, M., (2016).The temptation of intelligence politicization to support diplomacy. International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence29(1), pp.1-25.

71Schmitt, H. and Toygür, I., (2016). European Parliament elections of May 2014: driven by national politics or EU policy making?. Politics and governance4(1), pp.167-181.

72Wilkinson, M., (2018). Before Intelligence Failed: British Secret Intelligence on Chemical and Biological Weapons in the Soviet Union, South Africa and Libya.Oxford University Press.

EVALUATING THE QUALITY OF INTELLIGENCE: BY WHAT (MIS) MEASURE?”

Among the two interesting articles, it is difficult to choose one to read and engage with it, but I decided to choose the second one “‘Evaluating the Quality of Intelligence Analysis: By What (Mis) Measure?’ Intelligence and National Security, 27/6 (2012).

By: Dr. Stephen Marrin

The author of the article, Dr.Stephen Marrin works as a lecturer in the centre of intelligence and security department at the University of London. In his past career, he has worked under central intelligence agency as an analyst. Then he was also appointed in the US government accountability office.

The paper written by him named “evaluating the quality of intelligence: By what (mis) measure?” is being analyzed for the facts and other comments he has given in it for achieving quality intelligence1. He starts presenting the paper with the definition of quality. He derives quality as a standard which is measured by its absence and not presence. Intelligence analysis failure is considered as one of the reasons any flaw in intelligence.

Involvement of centre intelligence agency and consideration of idea of politics during taking decision regarding national policy and cyber security are biggest factors2. Along with that, taking decision regarding national policy is considered as vital one due to which maintenance of legal guidelines is important in context of securing life of common people. In case of influencing from political leaders and taking strategy from the views of politics, strategic decision based on national security might impact negatively on living standard on common people. Failure of intelligence analysis is the biggest reason of international war and scandal beyond which consideration of idea of politics is worst factor. But intelligence failures have many other reasons. Sometimes it includes the blind eye of the observer. The example of this can be seen here, when India concluded the nuclear tests in 1998, it raised a question on US’s intelligence system. Maybe the intelligence observers and analysts were not sure of the Indian nuclear test and that’s why they missed it. Here failure came in the form of a surprise. Similarly, some failures are termed as policy failures and some failures are termed as characterized inaccuracy. The author has described them by giving the examples of the Iraq War and CIA during the Vietnam War.

So, how can such intelligence analysis are evaluated. One of such methods is to define the accuracy standard. It is also termed as the black and white accuracy standard because of its comprehensiveness. The analysis and the intelligence failure are interrelated. The job of the analysis is to be accurate and then drive the intelligence. If the intelligence or the analysis is flawed, it can hamper the end analysis. Qualifiers are present in the analysis and the production process of intelligence analysis is full of uncertainties. If a CIA analyst is looking for a data story then he has to filter a lot of data. The public data for CIA includes a lot of things and the analyst ends up discovering many gaps in the data. To hide the lack of accuracy, the CIA documents and reports are full of words such as probably, likely, may, would, etc. it saves the reports from an easy assessment. Now, this raises a big question on the abundance of resources towards the intelligence agencies. For example, if they write in their report that Iraq probably has mass destruction weapons MDW, what should the reader derive from it. Does Iraq have weapons? Does Iraq not have weapons? Who knows?

Just like accuracy, the author has given another standard for evaluating the quality of analytics, named preventing surprises. Decision makers look for solid proofs in the area of analysis. When the decision makers are surprised by anything which is beyond their expectations, they are trying to blame the quality of intelligence in it. Preventing surprise is an important task of intelligence. If the surprises are not prevented, it means that the quality of intelligence has been compromised. These surprises are usually in terms of international relation.

Quality is most significant aspects in context of implementing policy based on national security and cyber security due to which appropriate duty of department of intelligence is important3. The author has described that failure of department of intelligence is the biggest reason of Iraq War and long war of Vietnam due to avoiding collection of strategic information regarding national security. On the contrary, taking decision regarding national security by following idea of politics could be significant aspects due to having positive impact on citizens4. Richard Betts has observed that occurring failure of department of intelligence is result of war and international scandal due to which collection of appropriate information based on national security is essential5. Due to which, he has described that probability of happening incidents such as war and long term scandal are high. In order to avoid failure of intelligence, recognizing of appropriate reason and impact on citizens are essential6. On the contrary, taking strategy regarding security and cyber protection is fully dependent upon idea of politics due to including strategic information7. Recognizing proper reasons of creating issues and impact of issues are significant way to lead different pitfalls such as stereotypes as well as biases.

The author has derived appropriate method of evaluating positive outcome in context of quality intelligence. One of the significant tasks of analysis of intelligence is to provide baseline based on which cyber security and protection of nation can be maintained significantly. Thus, it assists in acquiring idea of future issues regarding cyber security and protection. On the other hand, without considering idea of politics and politicism, strategic idea regarding national security cannot be implemented. Along with that, author has provided different examples such as 9/11 attack as well as Vietnam War due to having issues related to avoidance of analyzing and collecting information by department of intelligence8. In case of announcing decision regarding demonetization by Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, whole country has been surprised due to affecting living standard negatively. However, department of intelligence and Government both have taken significant decision on the basis of demonetization due to which higher amount of black money has been collected9. From the following point of view, it is clear that in some time taking decision based on national security by considering idea of politics might impact positively on living standard of a nation. Measuring analytical information with the use of baseball could be significant way to avoid failure of department of intelligence10. Thus, it impacts positively on living standard of common people due to analyzing required area needs to protect within a nation. On the other hand, avoiding of measuring standard during collection and analysis of strategic information based on security might impact negatively on living standard of common people11.

Decision makers are the top politicians and bureaucrats of the nation. Maintaining secrecy while creating the policies and implementing such policies is a strong strategy to prevent any external intelligence agency penetrating the walls of host security. Once if such task is completed with success, the other party get no reason to counterattack in any case. But there is a twist to it, as not all the secrecy boundaries can hold the surprises to come out. Sometimes even the international forces are so impact full that they surprise everyone involved, instantaneously. One of the good examples given by the author is the demolition of the berlin wall. However, there is one more surprising international event recently where India’s Prime Minister Mr. Narendra Modi, started the demonetization policy overnight. The whole country including the top businessmen and women and other bureaucrats were surprised by this economical upside down.

As per the author, there are many other people who have contributed in the shifting of quality intelligence standard from absolute to relative. Richard betts is one of them. He objects that the intelligence failures occurring due to surprise or inaccuracy are inevitable in nature and will occur anyhow. The probability of these occurring is high. Richard’s major goal was to remove the failure by recognizing the reasons of the inaccuracy or surprise and eradicating them one after the other.Sometimes the analyst’saware limitations are one of the reasons apart from surprise element and inaccuracy. These would lead to many pitfalls such as biases, stereotypes, normal thinking, and case effect dilemma and so on.

Now, there is yet another method to derive the evaluation of the quality intelligence, by the author. Scholars generally use the baseball metaphors and terminologies to evaluate the performance of the intelligence. The difference in between the fielding percentage is one way. Here anything which is less than top notch perfection is considered as error. By using these scholars try to show the importance of standards utilized in the evaluation of relative performance. The evaluation also depends upon other factors away from the surrounding. As an example, there is an effect of quality of pitch onto the batting average metrics.

One of the major tasks of the intelligence analysis is to offer us a reference line using which people can evaluate the present with the past. This can also help in forecasting the future performances. The author gives many clear examples of horrible events such as 9/11, the Vietnam War, the pearl harbour. these are big calamities to be ignored. To balance these there have been many successes as well. But these success stories are kept hidden while the failures are always highlighted. Would it be possible to check the intelligence quality on such terms? By doing literature analysis perhaps this would be a little easy to take in. But even in history there have been a lot of contradictions and conflicting interpretations. These kinds of processes generate more questions and confusions when evaluated side by side. For example, Richard Kerr and Richard Russel, being two important parts of the CIA evaluated their reports and gave two distinct conclusions. One positive and the other one is negative.

A clear cut intelligence analysis can answer many questions and also help in clearing the purpose of intelligence analysis. By using such methods or theory, the best of intelligence analysis practices can be achieved.

Reference List

Allen, R. and Reber, A.S., (2017). Unconscious intelligence. A companion to cognitive science, 1(10), pp.314-323.

Avey, P.C. and Desch, M.C., (2014). What do policymakers want from us? Results of a survey of current and former senior national security decision makers. International Studies Quarterly58(2), pp.227-246.

Betts, R.K., (2000). Is strategy an illusion?. International security, 25(2), pp.5-50.

Caparini, M., (2016). Controlling and overseeing intelligence services in democratic States. In Democratic Control of Intelligence Services. 1(10). pp. 25-46

Gruszczak, A. (2016). Intelligence Security in the European Union: building a strategic intelligence community. Springer: Berlin.

Marrin, S., (2012). Evaluating the quality of intelligence analysis: By what (mis) measure?. Intelligence and National Security27(6), pp.896-912.

Min, K.S., Chai, S.W. and Han, M., (2015). An international comparative study on cyber security strategy. International Journal of Security and Its Applications9(2), pp.13-20. Pillar, P.R., (2018). Intelligence, policy, and the war in Iraq. Manchester University Press: Manchester.

Bibliography

Allen, R. and Reber, A.S., (2017). Unconscious intelligence. A companion to cognitive science, 1(10), pp.314-323.

Avey, P.C. and Desch, M.C., (2014). What do policymakers want from us? Results of a survey of current and former senior national security decision makers. International Studies Quarterly58(2), pp.227-246.

Betts, R.K., (2000). Is strategy an illusion?. International security, 25(2), pp.5-50.

Caparini, M., (2016). Controlling and overseeing intelligence services in democratic States. In Democratic Control of Intelligence Services. 1(10). pp. 25-46

Gruszczak, A. (2016). Intelligence Security in the European Union: building a strategic intelligence community. Springer: Berlin.

Marrin, S., (2012). Evaluating the quality of intelligence analysis: By what (mis) measure?. Intelligence and National Security27(6), pp.896-912.

Min, K.S., Chai, S.W. and Han, M., (2015). An international comparative study on cyber security strategy. International Journal of Security and Its Applications9(2), pp.13-20. Pillar, P.R., (2018). Intelligence, policy, and the war in Iraq. Manchester University Press: Manchester.

Obydenkova, A. and Salahodjaev, R., (2016). Intelligence, democracy, and international environmental commitment. Environmental research147, pp.82-88.

Tomes, R.R., (2015). Socio-cultural intelligence and national security. Parameters45(2), pp.61-77.

Warner, M., (2014). The Rise and Fall of Intelligence: an international security History. Georgetown University Press: Washington.

1 Marrin, S., (2012). Evaluating the quality of intelligence analysis: By what (mis) measure?. Intelligence and National Security27(6), pp.896-912.

2 Pillar, P.R., (2018). Intelligence, policy, and the war in Iraq. Manchester University Press: Manchester.

3 Marrin, S., (2012). Evaluating the quality of intelligence analysis: By what (mis) measure?. Intelligence and National Security27(6), pp.896-912.

4 Gruszczak, A. (2016). Intelligence Security in the European Union: building a strategic intelligence community. Springer: Berlin.

5 Betts, R.K., (2000). Is strategy an illusion?. International security, 25(2), pp.5-50.

6 Allen, R. and Reber, A.S., (2017). Unconscious intelligence. A companion to cognitive science, 1(10), pp.314-323.

7 Min, K.S., Chai, S.W. and Han, M., (2015). An international comparative study on cyber security strategy. International Journal of Security and Its Applications9(2), pp.13-20.

8 Pillar, P.R., (2018). Intelligence, policy, and the war in Iraq. Manchester University Press: Manchester.

9 Avey, P.C. and Desch, M.C., (2014). What do policymakers want from us? Results of a survey of current and former senior national security decision makers. International Studies Quarterly58(2), pp.227-246.

10 Allen, R. and Reber, A.S., (2017). Unconscious intelligence. A companion to cognitive science, 1(10), pp.314-323.

11 Betts, R.K., (2000). Is strategy an illusion?. International security, 25(2), pp.5-50.

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